such as radiology and pathology, is considerably lower, probably around 2%.1 Diagnostic error has multiple causes, but principal among them are cognitive errors. Usually, it's not a lack of knowledge that leads to failure, but problems with the clinician's thinking. 
CLINICAL EXAMPLES OF COGNITIVE FAILURE

Case 1
A 21-year-old man is brought to a trauma center by ambulance. He has been stabbed multiple times in the arms, chest, and head. He is in no significant distress. He is inebriated but cooperative. He has no dyspnea or shortness of breath; air entry is equal in both lungs; oxygen saturation, blood pressure, and pulse are all within normal limits.
The chest laceration over his left scapula is deep but on exploration does not appear to penetrate the chest cavity. Nevertheless, there is concern that the chest cavity and You juggle up to about a dozen patients at one time.
Psychologists tell us that when your attention is distracted by interruptions, you have to refocus on something else and then you have to get back to where you were before, and that's very costly in terms of cognitive effort. Add to that the problem that most emergency departments operate around the clock, adding the complications of fatigue and sleep deprivation. And it's now fairly clear that in the last 3 or 4 hours of the night shift, the emergency physician is probably functioning at about 70% of his or her capability. So when you add all those things up, you realize that to expect high-quality decision-making is somewhat unrealistic.
RW:
One of the attributes of emergency medicine is how complex and undifferentiated patients are. So take me through the brain of Pat Croskerry when a patient with chest pain comes to see you, versus a physician who hasn't thought about the cognitive aspects of decision-making and diagnostic errors. What's going through your brain that's not going through that person's brain?
PC: I have the benefit of having analyzed a number of cases that went wrong and so I'm aware of the cognitive biases. They're not just thinking errors, they're also affective errors-errors that arise when physicians' feelings or nurses' feelings get involved in the decision-making process. And you can watch RW: I was interested in the notion of affective errors. So when you're having a bad day or you're angry with a patient or you're overwhelmed, how do you defend against that? Does it help that you're aware of the possible holes that you may fall into, or are there more specific strategies that you undertake to prevent errors from flowing from those different affects?
PC: I think awareness is number one. Physicians tend to think of themselves as cold, objective decisionmakers and we know that isn't so. If you take, for example, a borderline patient or a patient who's being obstructive, they create a negative atmosphere. The psychology literature tells us that hot emotionsemotions made when you're in a state of visceral arousal-are dangerous. If I find myself becoming emotionally polarized toward the patient, there are certain strategies that I follow to try to defuse that situation. One thing you can do is just take a time out and excuse yourself and say "I just have to attend to something else and I'll be right back." Then take a moment of reflection and identify your emotional arousal and try to get past it. The critical thing for me is to provide the best care here and not to allow my emotions to intrude. Now again, the psychology literature says that, not just in medicine but throughout your life, no decision is made that doesn't have some emotional polarization in it. If the patient is arousing negative emotions in you, then your decisions won't be as good as they would be otherwise.
By the same token, but to a lesser extent, you can get into similar trouble when your emotions are positively aroused. Some work has been done on this, but if you feel very positively toward the patient, sometimes there is a covert avoidance of finding the stuff that you don't want to know about. What I'm suggesting is that physicians would do well to develop skills in emotional intelligence.
You've talked mostly about things that are going on between your ears that might help prevent certain errors in charged situations with a lot of uncertainty. Systematic solutions have also been proposed, such as computerized decision support or others. What's your sense of the utility of those kinds of approaches?
PC: Well, my starting point is that we will take whatever help we can get. A number of initiatives have been proposed that help us in our decision-making. Decision-making, which arguably is the most important skill that a physician has, breaks down into two types of reasoning. We reason intuitively-the fast, reflective shoot-from-the-hip stuff that all of us do, and as you get older, you do it more. That's in contrast to a slower analytical, deductive method that's much more precise and often yields fewer errors.
Given that we spend most of our time in that fast intuitive mode, in emergency medicine at least, then the answer to the problem would be how do you make people function better in the intuitive mode? I was delighted to see a paper by Gordon Schiff and David Bates published in the New England Journal of Medicine about improving electronic documentation to avoid diagnostic error. They listed a dozen or so features that might help people improve their performance; interestingly, they match up very well with what the literature says. There is an excellent book by [Robin M.] Hogarth called Educating Intuition, and he makes exactly these points. It's been shown very clearly that better environments make for better decisions. If you improve the feedback that people receive and if you have systems that prompt and remind you along with checklists and so on, there's a variety of strategies aimed at improving one's performance in that intuitive mode. So for my money, I think that approach needs encouraging.
What will the practice of emergency medicine look like in 5 or 10 years, particularly vis-à-vis computer systems and decision support?
PC: Well, it's very clear that computerized decision support is a good idea, but it hasn't had a very good track record. Work on this started about 40 years ago. To some extent, the problem is partly the overconfidence of physicians, who think that they can outperform computers, and a lot of the time, they probably cannot. People are really challenged when they have to make more and more decisions. But if a computer interface that-let's say you were distracted or didn't have time to take everything into consideration-notices something that you didn't take into consideration, then it says, "You are about to discharge a patient with an elevated heart rate." Those little prompts are often enough to jolt you out of that intuitive mode, take a moment of reflection, and perhaps make a better decision. The medication information in computerized order entry systems is excellent. If you plug in the wrong dose or the dose is too high for somebody in renal failure, it lets you know right away, and that's the cognitive support we need. The more you can provide software that functions more reliably than your own brain, then the better the position you're in. into an algorithm that says the best management of TIA is this, this, and this, then that's where I go, because I know that those clinical decision rules have been developed by well-rested, well-fed people in the cold light of day who've looked at huge populations of patients. And they will outperform my decisionmaking, especially in the environment in which I'm working.
Can you give us a couple of examples of things that you built into your emergency departments that reflect your interest in safety and that you're particularly proud of?
PC:
The major thing that we did was to change the nature of our M&M rounds. When I first inherited the department, we would have people presenting cases on their diagnostic triumphs or on some interesting esoteric case. But we weren't looking critically at what we were doing. So we turned our M&M rounds around, focusing on cognitive errors, affective errors, biases, distortions of reasoning, and so on. When I first came into my department, we were not doing that. It's been helped by the patient safety movement of course. But there is now an openness and an honesty in the way that people will review their cases. That was one of our major gains.
The other one was that we really put a concerted effort into improving feedback. To have a system operating without feedback, as we often do in emergency departments, complex patients just disappear in the ICU or disappear into the morgue and you haven't really learned anything. We implemented a number of strategies that have significantly improved our feedback.
RW:
In both of those circumstances, part of the theme is getting your colleagues and yourself to be comfortable learning about and hearing about your failures unblinkingly. How did you get the culture to accept that?
PC: It wasn't easy. We were inheriting a very long tradition in medicine of secrecy. Diagnostic acumen, for example, is the one thing that physicians hold very dear. It's the most important thing to them. To actually stand up and say "I got this wrong" takes a bit of guts. The way that that works best is if you can get senior physician leaders to stand up and admit that they've made mistakes and show by example that it's okay to say you're not perfect. I certainly did that and I didn't suffer by it. The department generally became more honest and more willing to discuss our shortcomings. At the same time, remind people that we have to deal with a level of uncertainty that can never allow us to become perfect decision-makers.
There's always a huge residue of uncertainty that we must learn to live with. say what you think you were doing wrong. If anything, physicians have a tendency to be overcritical of themselves. Then you can say, look, if you understand the error process and the biases and the obstacles put in your way, then you can feel better about some bad decisions that you did make.
Any other recommendations you would make to emergency medicine physicians or people managing emergency departments?
PC: When I came into emergency medicine, nobody sat me down and said, this is what your life is going to be like. I think that's good in any area of medicine. To be frank with people and let them know what's coming and the sorts of failures that they're going to experience and so on, I think it just makes things more realistic. In my career, I've had a number of close colleagues who left emergency medicine because they couldn't live with the consequences of what they perceived to be a mistake on their part. So my advice to anybody coming in would be to talk to some of the older physicians and ask them what it's going to be like. Hopefully, they will get a realistic appraisal and they won't see it as a place where they must demonstrate perfection.
Anything else that you want to talk about that we didn't cover?
PC: I do think that the whole business of shift work is devastating to people, and we have to find better ways of scheduling people in emergency departments. We've developed a system here called casino shifts, where we actually change over at 3:00 in the morning. That sounds counterintuitive, but if you set this up right, you will actually improve people's longevity in the discipline. The number one reason given by physicians for leaving emergency medicine is the shift work. It's extremely difficult to make good decisions in the last 3 or 4 hours of the night shift. We need to do more work on sorting that out. There are ways of identifying people who are different prototypes. You know, you have morning people and evening people, and as you get older you tend to become more of a morning person. So you can set up individual shift scheduling, which optimizes the physiological capabilities of age and physiological chronotype. I think that's extremely important. Shift work is a necessary evil, but it's an evil that we can dilute to some extent, and get more out of people and make them happier.
